NOIR WHITE PAPER #3

SERIES ON INSIDER THREAT/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERESPIONAGE

PREVENTION
THE MISSING LINK

Proposing a New, Comprehensive Strategy to ***Prevent***, Not Detect, Insider Threat in the US Intelligence Community

Counterintelligence is the Stepchild of the Intelligence Community

Prevention is the Stepchild of Counterintelligence

Detection Gets All the Love

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OUTLINE

PART ONE
Proposing a New, Comprehensive Strategy to *Prevent*—Not Detect—Insider Threat in the Intelligence Community (IC)

- The Problem: Insider Threat
- Analyzing Failed Links in Security Chains
- Missing Links in IC Security Chains: Off-Ramp Exits

PART TWO
Scope of the Problem

- Importance of Prevention Despite Neglect
- Overly Focusing on Detection at the Expense of Prevention
- Great Hopes of the Moment
- Dirty Little Secret of Counterintelligence

PART THREE
The NOIR White Paper Series on Insider Threat, Counterintelligence (CI) and Counterespionage (CE)

- White Paper Part 1: *"True Psychology of the Insider Spy"* This paper introduced the *Core Psychology of the Insider Spy* as well as the *Ten Life Stages of the Insider Spy*
- White Paper Part 2: *"NOIR: Proposing A New Policy for Improving National Security by Fixing the Problem of Insider Spies"*
- White Paper Part 3: This paper will examine in detail the most important missing link in IC security chains: Prevention
- The Vision: A Full Spectrum Solution for Managing Insider Threat

PART FOUR
Rethinking Insider Threat

Introducing two new complementary categories that advance a high-level conceptual overview of insider threat management:

- **External Management of Insider Threat (EMIT)**
- **Internal Management of Insider Threat (IMIT)**
- Human Psychology is Central to IMIT-Based Prevention
  - Situations of Concern
  - Modern Sales Practices Are Key for Achieving "Left of Boom" Interventions
    - At its root, the insider threat actor's problem is self-disappointment and loss of self-respect
  - Not New! IMIT-Based Approaches Already Practiced in Specialized IC Units
    - Basic Strategy with Hostage Takers ("hostages" in IC = classified information)
  - Behavioral Change Stairway Model
- Full Spectrum Solution for Managing IC Insider Threat Requires EMIT and IMIT
  - EMIT-based detection is necessary but not sufficient
  - IMIT-based prevention complements, does not replace EMIT-based detection
  - **Prevention addresses the situation *before* the decision gets made to cross the line—*the most important missing link in the security chain***
  - Detection needs to be supplemented by adding off-ramp exit solutions

EMIT versus IMIT

FACTORS	EMIT	IMIT
Professional Identity	Police	Sales
Spirit of Professionals	Hunters	Farmers
Actions	Catch	Persuade
Manner of Engagement	Doing TO	Doing WITH
Approach	Hard	Soft
Type of Cop	Bad Cop	Good Cop
Carrots and Sticks	Sticks Only	Carrots Too
Emotional Tone	Cold	Warm
Sensitive to Psychology	Minimal	Maximal
Concerns About Subject's Family	None	Major
Change Subject's Thinking?	No	Yes
Subject's Decision	Involuntary	Voluntary
Identified How?	Detection	Self-Identified
Highest Aim	Punish	Save
Ideally, How it Ends?	Incarceration	Back to Work
Where?	Bureau of Prisons	Home Agency
Ancillary Professionals	Lawyers, Judges	Counselors

  - Prevention provides the front-end off-ramp exit solution
  - NOIR provides the back-end exit solution for after the decision gets made to cross the line
- *Goals of this paper:* Change the current situation, which is the almost exclusive reliance by the IC on EMIT. Remedy the imbalance by adding IMIT tools to the arsenal.
- *Comment on "Whistleblowers:"* Proposals explored in this paper are designed to be effective not only with conventional state-sponsored insider spies but also with whistleblowers and other categories of insider threat actors.

PART FIVE
Detection: Strengths and Weaknesses

- Detection: Core Mission of Traditional Law Enforcement
- Strengths of Detection
- Weaknesses of Detection
  - Factors Contributing to Detection Weakness
    - Present Day Conditions
      - — Exponentially Increased Risk Today
      - — More Foreign Intelligence Entities on the Prowl
      - — Generational Changes
    - Intrinsic Weaknesses
      - — Detection is Subject to the Law of Diminishing Returns
    - Workplace Barriers That Thwart Detection
      - — Coworkers find it hard to speak up; Moral reluctance; Privacy concerns; Legal risks; Functional blindness; Pervasive all-seeing surveillance regime can backfire
    - Workforce Hiring Paradoxes Within the IC
      - — IC's Claims About Its Ideal Hires
    - Net Result of Detection Weaknesses
      - — Overly stringent detection surveillance regimes can cut two ways. Weighing security vs. competence, what is the right balance?
    - Detection is nearly useless with "whistleblowers"
    - Problems in Execution
      - — "Solving" Problems: Appearances vs. Reality
        Government tends to throw big money at tough problems for solutions that will not necessarily work

— False negatives, false positives, and other confusing or bad results

- Looking Ahead: Excessively Optimistic Claims for New High-Tech Advances
  - Artificial Intelligence (AI), Big Data, Algorithms, and Machine Learning (ML)
  - Algorithm Bias: A Newly Named Concept
  - Paradigm of Home Security Systems
  - Thresholds in the Context of the IC
    — If set too high or if set too low; no way to achieve a perfect threshold setting!
  - Defining Suspects Based on an Algorithm
    — An Insider Threat Score?
    — Arbitrary Thresholds Tend to Get Turned into Concrete Categories
  - Congratulations! You Identified a Suspect. Now What?
    — High-Tech Indicators: Helpful or Problematic?
    — Parallels the Problem of What to Do with Weather Forecasts
    — Bring in the Big Guns: The FBI Will Solve It!
    — Hassles Managing Suspects
  - Despite the Hype, High Tech Offers Little Relief for Decision Makers
  - Defeating Newest Detection Technology? Zero Days Are Every Day
    — Determined Insiders can and will defeat any security technology devised
    — Exceptions showing the best protections can be overcome
    — What everybody in the information technology (IT) world knows
    — Cycle Times and OODA Loops
    — Continuous Evaluation (CE)
    — Message to Designers of Detection Systems, Including CE

- Big Picture Considerations: **IMIT Advantages Over EMIT**
  - Easier Decisions • Cheaper • Faster
  - Easier to manage • Rescue vs. Catch
  - Sadly, Not Every Troubled Employee Will Be Rescuable

IMIT confers advantages over EMIT for managing insider threat both before and after crossing the line. EMIT still remains the bedrock foundation for robust multilayered defenses against insider threat.

PART SIX

Prevention: Strengths and Weaknesses

- Strengths of Current Practices
  - Prevention elements that do work well, often combined with elements of detection
- Weaknesses of Today
  - Cultural: Prevention is the Stepchild of Counterintelligence
  - Measuring Success: Prevention's Biggest Problem
  - Prevention Resources Today Need Strengthening
    - Three Classes of Troubled Employees
    - Stories Heard from the Corridor re EAPs

      Result: Employees of greatest concern, with the most serious problems, are the very ones who will not dare make the call for help and will never show up at their home agency's EAP.
    - EAPs Today are like Urgent Care Centers

PART SEVEN

Building A New Comprehensive Prevention Program

- General Considerations
  - IMIT Concepts Will Be Its Guiding Principles
    - Key Concern: Safety is Number One
    - "Lean on Me"
    - Initial Contact: Making It Safe
    - Off-Ramp Exits Needed *Before* Someone Crosses the Line
    - Rapid
    - Remove all Barriers
    - Comprehensive and Practical
- Useful Starting Fact: About 90% of Insider Threat Actors Are Male
  - Males constitute about 90% of caught spies.
- Intervention Windows: When Open or Closed?
  - *First Open Window:* Stage 2 (Stress/Spiral Stage): *Before* Someone Crosses the Line
  - Intervening During Early and Mid-Stage 2
  - *Closed Windows:* Stages 3 and 4: The Blackout Periods
  - *Open Windows:* Stage 5 (Remorse, Morning After Stage); Stage 6 (Active Spy Career Stage); and Stage 7 (Dormancy Stage): The Stages *After* Someone Crosses the Line
- Two Tier Structure
  - *First Tier:* Existing EAPs Internal to Each IC Agency
  - *Second Tier:* Second Level EAP—Outside Home Agency
- Resources Must Be Real

  To truly fulfill promises to help, the IC cannot make promises that are not kept! Resources offered need to go beyond psychological counseling.
  - An External EAP Has the Advantages of a Third Party
    - What is Needed and Why
    - Setting Up Resources Will Not Be Simple
      — Staffing Personnel Will Be Challenging
      — Specialized Training Will Be Needed
      — Authorities

        Primary Aim: Rescue a basically good employee and get him back to work
    - Separation from service must remain an option
    - Case Manager Approach
    - Security Concerns
- Making New Prevention Program Work
  - Targeting the Correct Audience
  - Communicating the Right Way with the Target Audience
    - Adopt Proper Tone
    - Engage by Making Offers Instead of Threats
    - Packaging Offers
- New Prevention Program Should Be Rolled Out in Phases
  - *Phase One:* Redefining the Meaning of Spying
    - Can a Commonly Held Assumptions Be Changed? Yes, If Done Right
    - How Redefining the Meaning of Spying Helps Change Inner Calculations
  - *Phase Two:* Proving the Redefined Meaning of Spying
    - Consider the Power of Memes
  - *Phase Three:* Getting the Messages Out
    - Outreach to the General Public
    - New Security Training for the IC Workforce
      — Semi-Annual Computerized Training
      — New helping resources will be described

- — The new two-tier structure of EAPs would be explained
- — Live Events
- — Messaging

- Locate Second-Tier Prevention Resources Under the ODNI
  - Employees Temporarily Immune to Prevention Messages
    - Whistleblowers
    - Employees with ethnic, ideological, or religious motives
    - Psychopathic and antisocial types
    - Not yet ready
- No Claim Made for a Perfect Solution
  The primary goal is to significantly reduce the prevalence of insider threat events
- Legal Hurdles to Be Overcome
  - Conflicts with Existing Laws Have to Be Solved
  - Hard Sell But There's a Precedent: WITSEC

PART EIGHT

Conclusions

- Detection is Necessary But Not Sufficient
- Missing Links: Two Off-Ramp Exits
- To Move "Left of Boom," a Full Spectrum Solution is Needed
- Combining Front and Back End Solutions
  If it's not possible to head off insider threat actors before crossing the line, then the next best thing is to stop them afterwards, the sooner the better (NOIR)

Ten Life Stages of the Insider Spy



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. David L. Charney

Dr. Charney is the Founder and Medical Director of Roundhouse Square Counseling Center, in Alexandria, Virginia. He specializes in Anxiety and Mood Disorders, Couples and Family Therapy, as well as Attention Deficit Disorder in adults.

In addition to his usual practice, he has also treated personnel from within the Intelligence Community. As a result of unusual circumstances, he had the opportunity to join the defense team of his first spy case, Earl Pitts. Subsequently, Plato Cacheris, the attorney of Robert Hanssen, invited Dr. Charney to join his defense team, which added a further dimension to his experience. With the addition of his third spy case, Brian Regan, Dr. Charney further deepened his knowledge of the psychological nuances of captured spies.

As a member of their defense teams, Dr. Charney was perceived by these insider spies as an understanding and supportive figure, which lowered their defensive mindsets, and provided a truer picture of their inner lives. Many common assumptions of spy motivation were brought into question by Dr. Charney's work.

Dr. Charney elaborated his findings in Part One of his White Paper, entitled *True Psychology of the Insider Spy.* Part Two of his White Paper, entitled *NOIR* (proposing a National Office for Intelligence Reconciliation), lays out Dr. Charney's innovative and perhaps controversial recommendations for making use of what he learned to better manage the problem of insider spies. To educate and promote these concepts and ideas, he founded NOIR for USA, a non-profit organization. Its website is: NOIR4USA.org.■

For more information or further briefings, contact Dr. David Charney:

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