Feedback About NOIR

Here is some of the feedback we’ve received from intelligence professionals about the NOIR concept as found in NOIR: A White Paper. Please let us know your feedback.

“I have read your paper with great interest, and it is brilliant; I applaud your insights as to how the problem develops and matures and your innovative solution which I hope we as a nation have the wit to implement.” Former Senior CIA Operations Officer and Executive with over 30 years of service

“I think you have an outstanding idea.”Former FBI Special Agent with 30 years of service

“A very interesting paper. It has merit and the intelligence CI elements would be wise to explore some of the ideas.”Former CIA Deputy Director with 32 years of service

“I must admit that I was skeptical when I began Part Two but found the arguments for reconciliation quite compelling as I read through the paper.”—Former CIA Operations Officer with over 30 years of service

“I’ve read through Dr. Charney’s work with great interest. As a veteran of the intelligence community I’ve long felt our response to insider spying has been misguided and ineffective as a result. I think Dr. Charney’s approach is almost certain to better contain the damage insiders can do and I urge those with an interest in the intelligence area to give it serious examination.” Former Army INSCOM

“I found the NOIR proposal to be an interesting, insightful concept and a positive step toward the reduction of vulnerability to treachery.” Former CIA clandestine officer with 29 years of service

“I think that the idea is well worth pursuing. We need to engage both technological and psychological tools to deter and detect the insider spy.”Former Director of Operations and Investigations of the US Army Foreign Counterintelligence

“I read your NOIR: A White Paper with intense interest. I believe you are onto a methodology that should be taken very seriously, but I also can appreciate the resistance you are probably encountering from the entrenched establishment.”Former FBI Special Agent with 27 years of service

“Seven Factors driving for reconciliation – highly unconventional, but very well formulated. The ten Rationales for NOIR well described – the bitter truth. During lectures at the Pentagon, my partner and I have often wondered how we could improve counterintelligence measures? At that time we would have thought your NOIR operation to be “immoral.” Reading your dissertation, my long deceased friend would have said, “So is espionage.” And, I think he would have approved.”Former military intelligence officer with 40 years of service

“NOIR would be valuable from a counterintelligence viewpoint in that regard by conducting triage on incoming potential threats before they are allowed to become real threats.”Former Army officer

“Your White Paper carefully lays out the benefits of the NOIR proposal, and I should think that the Intelligence Community would by and large support it. Most intelligence professionals would agree that the positives far outweigh the negatives of NOIR. But then again, the apprehension, prosecution and punishment of spies is not their raison d’etre. It will be fascinating to see how law enforcement — primarily the FBI and the DOJ — react to a proposal that directly affects their livelihoods.Former CIA security officer

“I was very impressed by your determination and outstanding work contribution. I was particularly gratified with your “Ten Life Stages of the Insider Spy.” Excellent work and right on target. Based on my experience in dealing with American traitors within the intelligence community, who worked for foreign governments, you have raised the bar in dealing with traitors. Your idea on the option of “Reconciliation” for certain spies “not yet identified,” is a thought provoking proposition. However, as you know from past experience, it would be a hard pill for the intelligence community to swallow, let alone DOJ. That doesn’t mean it wouldn’t be worth taking the risk in certain special circumstances.”Former NCIS Special Agent with 22 years of service

“Right now there are those in the Intelligence Community spying against America—and they aren’t happy people. But they continue spying because they realize there’s no way out. A NOIR would give them a way out and put a stop to the loss of classified information NOW rather than later.Former CIA counterintelligence officer

“Overall, a very clear and well-written proposal. The lead-in information is essential to effectively ‘selling’ the NOIR concept, and it is undoubtedly a difficult sell. Dr. Charney’s honesty in dealing with the NOIR proposal is refreshing, and he tackles the obvious objections head on. One point I have made in my presentations is that, ultimately, most spies get caught. I always add that, statistically, you WILL be caught. This fact is in the mind of every insider spy at one time or another, and is a reason why the approach set forth in this White Paper is so relevant.”Jens Karney (formerly known as Jeff Carney, former cryptologic linguist for the USAF (1980-1985); spy for the HVA (Foreign Intelligence Directorate) of the GDR’s Ministry of State Security (MfS) from 1983-1989

“Impressed by your determination and outstanding work contribution.”

“Yours is one of the few breaths of fresh air in the CI/CE field I’ve ever seen, and I’ve been involved with that field in one way or another for over 30 years.”

“Thanks again for the work you are doing…the paper made me a believer.”

“Congratulations. Truly brilliant.”

“I recently read the NOIR White Paper and am very impressed. I believe this concept is a “must.” Thank you for the opportunity to review this wonderful product. I am confident that NOIR will succeed.”

From a former US Army INSCOM:

“Studying traitors never occurred to me, nor I imagine to most in the intel community. I think that’s entirely because of the revulsion almost everyone feels towards traitors. I think that revulsion prompts an irrational, emotional response to the problem of insider breaches, more concerned with taking vengeance on the spy than preventing and curtailing the activity.

As an undergrad in Administration of Justice department, I did research project on the death penalty and drew the conclusion that the cost to house a murderer in their mid-20s for life was, at the time, less than a half million dollars, but the cost to take a death penalty case from first conviction and sentencing to actual execution was then running about $13 million in costs to the legal justice system. So I argued to my classmates that the economically rational thing to do was end the death penalty. The Biblicists argued that morality required society take vengeance on the murderer, and others that the death penalty was a deterrent. We could prove with hard numbers it was not a deterrent.

It became apparent that the entire reason for the death penalty for its advocates was to express outrage and take vengeance on the offender, not reduce homicide, certainly not to reduce social costs, let alone understand the mind of the murderer and what could be done to prevent homicide ever happening. They wanted blood, and no rational proposal could shake the committed from their pro-execution positions.

As you have understood, this same emotionalism prevents us from dealing with traitors in a way that would actually curtail breaches, because, whether we admit it or not, we are less concerned to compartmentalize and protect our intelligence information and field personnel than we are to express our outrage at spies and leakers. When it comes to traitors we fall back on our primitive tribal instinct to sanction non-conformity. This keeps us from engaging in critical thinking about the problem of insider spying to begin with, and this, I believe, is why we are just so damn bad at counterintelligence.

I think your proposals have undeniable merit and should be expanded upon, broadly discussed, and progress toward the design and implementation of your proposed process. Our manner of handling insider spying must be based in cold-calculation, aimed at minimizing the problem and protecting our intelligence and gathering capabilities, as opposed focused on visiting horrible consequences on the miniscule number of insider spies we actually, and mostly accidentally uncover.